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Reining in Commercial Exploitation of 
Consumer Data 
Max N. Helveston* 
ABTRACT 
 
The collection and use of consumer data by commercial entities has 
quickly transitioned from being an obscure topic to a headlining issue in 
leading media outlets. The burgeoning societal awareness of how digital 
devices are collecting and transmitting data about individuals has led to 
growing concerns about how this information is being used, stored, and 
sold. Legal scholars have identified insurance as one of the market sectors 
where commercial use of individuals’ data could be particularly harmful 
to consumers. They have argued that, if left unrestricted, insurers would 
use Big Data analytics in ways that would decrease marginalized 
populations’ access to insurance, limit individual liberties, and allow 
insurers to shirk their contractual obligations. 
Working from the assumption that these concerns are valid, this 
Article considers whether existing laws are sufficient to prevent these 
abuses and provides an account of where further protections are needed. It 
argues that the primary laws targeted at restricting companies’ purchase 
and use of personal data—the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the California 
Consumer Privacy Act, and the Vermont Data Broker Act—may prevent 
certain problematic behaviors, but will not deter others. Additional state 
action will be necessary to protect consumers from exclusionary 
advertising practices, unfair underwriting rules, and bad faith claims 
handling behaviors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Max Helveston is the Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of 
Law, at DePaul University College of Law. The author would like to express his sincere 
gratitude to the executive board of the Penn State Law Review for organizing the 
symposium and for all of the work that went into editing this piece. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the hottest topics in recent years has been society’s growing 
recognition of the enormous market for consumers’ personal information 
and how current laws provide individuals with almost no control over who 
records, purchases, and sells their data.1 With news of major data security 
breaches and privacy policy lapses in the headlines regularly,2 it is not 
 
 1. See, e.g., Emily Glazer et al., Facebook to Banks: Give Us Your Data, We’ll Give 
You Our Users, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://on.wsj.com/2Oh1p2Q; Khadeeja 
Safdar, On Hold for 45 Minutes? It Might Be Your Secret Customer Score, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 1, 2018) https://on.wsj.com/2SFhK46; Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Your Apps 
Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
10, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2SFm9DE; How to think about data in 2019, THE ECONOMIST 
(Dec. 22, 2018), https://econ.st/2EGaTUk; see also Bill Davidow, Redlining for the 21st 
Century, ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2014), https://bit.ly/2H3IDK6 (describing prohibitions against 
redlining and how Big Data could lead to unfair discrimination in the commercial sector). 
 2. See, e.g., Raymond Zhong, Quora, the Q. and A. Site, Says Data Breach Affected 
100 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2AUpAyO; Mike Isaac & 
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surprising that individuals have begun to look to the government to enact 
laws that will protect their interests.3 While the United States federal 
government has not been able to pass a comprehensive consumer privacy 
law like the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, state 
legislatures have begun to enact consumer privacy statutes.4 
Legal scholars have identified a variety of ways in which insufficient 
protection for consumer privacy will harm consumers.5 Some have 
identified insurance as one of the market sectors where businesses’ use of 
individuals’ data poses a particularly large threat to consumer welfare.6 
They have argued that, if left unrestricted, insurers could use Big Data 
analytics in ways that would decrease marginalized populations’ access to 
insurance, limit individual liberties, and allow insurers to shirk their 
contractual obligations.7 
This Article provides an account of whether the data protection laws 
that are currently in effect are sufficient to address these insurance-related 
problems and to proscribe solutions for regulatory gaps. Part I discusses 
the threats to consumer welfare that will manifest if the law allows 
insurance companies’ unfettered access to consumer data and permits 
them to integrate analytics throughout their business operations.8 Part II 
analyzes some of the primary laws that regulate commercial use of 
consumer data—the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the California Consumer 
Privacy Act, and the Vermont Data Broker Act—and discusses each law’s 
applicability to insurers.9 Part III concludes by discussing whether these 
laws are sufficient to deter insurers from engaging in problematic 
 
Natasha Singer, Facebook Says Bug Opened Access to Private Photos, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
14, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2rD7Rb6. 
 3. See David Meyer, In the Wake of GDPR, Will the U.S. Embrace Data Privacy?, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://bit.ly/2AIIGrV; Americans Say, “Bring on the Data 
Privacy Regulations!”, EMARKETER (May 21, 2018), https://bit.ly/2LmLG5z. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Towards a 
Framework To Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96–109 (2014); 
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014); Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination 
in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1378–79 (2014); Amy J. Schmitz, Secret 
Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating “Haves” from “Have-Nots,” 2014 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1451–52 (2014). 
 6. See Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 859, 859 (2016) [hereinafter Helveston, Consumer Protection]; Rick Swedloff, 
Risk Classification’s Big Data (R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 339, 339 (2014–2015); 
Peter Siegelman, Information & Equilibrium in Insurance Markets with Big Data, 21 
CONN. INS. L.J. 317, 329 (2014–2015). 
 7. See Helveston, Consumer Protection, supra note 6, at 859; Swedloff, supra note 
6, at 339; Siegelman, supra note 6, at 329. 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
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behaviors and suggests specific regulatory approaches that should be used 
to address any shortfalls.10 
II. PART 1 – BIG DATA ANALYTICS, INSURERS, AND THE 
THREAT TO CONSUMERS 
Legal scholars have identified legal and societal problems that are 
likely to manifest due to the widespread availability of consumers’ 
personal data and rapid advancements in the analytic sophistication of 
commercial entities.11 While some articles have looked at how these 
changes will affect consumers’ generally, others have focused on specific 
sectors. There have been a handful of articles looking at the problems that 
could result from use of consumer analytics in the personal insurance 
market.12 
It is not surprising that the academics working in this field have 
expressed significantly different views about the type of risks posed by 
Big Data-informed insurers and the extent to which additional regulation 
is needed to protect consumers. Despite this lack of consensus, the 
literature has done a good job of identifying the potential ways that 
insurers’ use of individuals’ data could imperil consumer welfare. This 
Part will provide an overview of these threats in two steps. First, it will 
discuss the three segments of insurers’ operations that could change with 
increased use of analytics. Second, it will review the different types of 
harms that consumers could suffer. 
A. How Big Data Analytics Could Change Insurers’ Operations 
It is worth noting that the threats to consumer welfare posed by the 
integration of Big Data into the insurance industry have the potential to be 
more substantial than they are in other market sectors. Not only will the 
 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, 
Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENV. L. REV. 87, 130–
31 (2018); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big 
Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63–65 (2012) (“Data has become the raw material 
of production, a new source of immense economic and social value.”); Omer Tene & Jules 
Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 248 (2013) (discussing business benefits of big data); Crawford 
& Schultz, supra note_5, at 96–109 (discussing privacy harms associated with the use of 
predictive analytics); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 5, at 17–18; Zarsky, supra note 5, at 
1375; Schmitz, supra note 5, at 1411; Ed Mierzwinski & Jeff Chester, Selling Consumers 
Not Lists: The New World of Digital Decision-Making and the Role of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 845, 866–67 (2013); Max N. Helveston, Regulating 
Digital Markets, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 33, 33 (2016). 
 12. See Helveston, Consumer Protection, supra note 6, at 859; Swedloff, supra note 
6, at 339; Siegelman, supra note 6, at 317. 
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use of Big Data analytics result in the selective advertising and marketing 
behaviors that have been identified as a problem for all business entities,13 
but the unique nature of the insurance relationship means that there will 
be additional dangers. Unlike the typical consumer transaction, which 
involves an instantaneous or near-instantaneous exchange, the contracts 
between insurance companies and consumers necessarily create a long-
term contractual relationship between the parties and incentivize insurers 
to be selective about which individuals they sell coverage to. Further, 
insurance contracts invest insurance companies with substantial discretion 
about when and how they need to perform. Finally, pricing discrimination 
is common and non-controversial in insurance markets, so long as it stays 
within statutory and regulatory boundaries. This unique constellation of 
characteristics creates novel opportunities—specifically in underwriting 
and claims handling—for insurers to engage in unfair Big Data-related 
practices.14 
1. Marketing 
Practically anybody who has watched television, engaged with online 
media, or browsed the web can attest to the fact that insurance companies 
spend a substantial amount each year on advertising and marketing their 
products to consumers.15 Commercials for automotive, homeowner’s, and 
other personal lines of coverage have become prevalent across digital 
media platforms. These advertisements use mascots (e.g., the GEICO 
gecko, Flo the Progressive agent) and slogans (e.g., “Like a good neighbor, 
State Farm is There”) designed to instill potential customers with a sense 
that the insurer will act in the policyholder’s best interest and build brand 
affiliation.16 
The growth of the digital world and the increasing amount of time 
that individuals spend online have begun to revolutionize how businesses 
approach marketing. Insurers, like other businesses, have started to look at 
 
 13. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 
8–9 (Jan. 2016), https://bit.ly/1n52gG6 [hereinafter FTC, BIG DATA]; PETER CORBETT ET 
AL., IBM INST. FOR BUS. VALUE, ANALYTICS: THE REAL-WORLD USE OF BIG DATA IN 
INSURANCE 3–7 (May 2013), https://bit.ly/2V2t4HN (describing how advanced analytics 
could be incorporated into insurers’ marketing, underwriting, claims management, and 
other practices); STACKIQ, CAPITALIZING ON BIG DATA ANALYTICS FOR THE INSURANCE 
INDUSTRY 3–4 (2012), https://bit.ly/2GXx2ML (same). 
 14. See Helveston, Consumer Protection, supra note 6, at 887–88. 
 15. See Craig Davis, Why Do Insurance Companies Advertise So Much?, THE 
CONTENT STRATEGIST (Feb. 6., 2017), https://bit.ly/2ViCeVB; Jessica McGregor & Megan 
Sutela, How Advertising Spend, Underwriting Results Relate to Auto Insurers’ New 
Business Yield: J.D. Power, INS. J. (June 19, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Wquv43. 
 16. JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T 
PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 53 (Penguin Group 2010). 
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how predictive analytics could inform and improve the ways they reach 
out to potential consumers.17 Not only are they keen on finding ways to 
ensure that potential customers get advertisements that are optimally 
tailored for the recipient, but there is interest in making sure that their ads 
are being delivered to the specific communities the insurer wishes to 
target.18 
The nature of the insurance agreement gives insurers an even greater 
incentive to engage in marketing activities that focus on certain groups and 
excludes others than with other commercial entities. Whereas vendors 
engaged in the sale of simple goods or services can easily determine how 
much it will cost them to perform their end of a deal, insurance companies 
cannot. Instead, the cost of performance for any given policy will depend 
on whether the policyholder suffers fortuitous covered losses. This 
dynamic creates a large incentive for insurers to do what they can to avoid 
signing deals with consumers that are likely to suffer large losses or who 
are difficult to predict accurately.19 In the context of marketing and 
advertising, this would mean using targeted advertising practices that 
exclude individuals with characteristics that indicate high risk or volatility. 
While this type of screening might seem unobjectionable—at first 
glance, it seems nearly identical to the screening that insurers engage in 
when underwriting—there are unique harms associated with using 
selective advertising practices to limit the applicant pool. First, doing so 
could allow insurers to effectively undermine existing laws and 
regulations that prohibit certain underwriting practices.20 Second, it may 
be more difficult for potential policing entities (e.g., plaintiff’s attorneys, 
insurance regulators) to take action against insurers that use selective 
marketing to prevent certain populations from applying for insurance than 
it would be if the insurers were denying these groups through the 
underwriting process.21 
2. Underwriting 
For as long as insurance arrangements have existed, insuring entities 
have used data to inform their underwriting decisions. Indeed, insurer 
solvency is largely dependent upon their ability to analyze information 
about their applicants and make prudent decisions about the rate (if any) 
 
 17. See CHARLES NYCE, AM. INST. FOR CPCU/INS. INST. OF AM., WHITE PAPER ON 
PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS 4–5 (2007), https://bit.ly/2ugbJRK (describing how insurers could 
use Big Data to improve their marketing practices). 
 18. See id. 
 19. See CORBETT ET AL., supra note 13, at 3–7; STACKIQ, supra note 13, at 3–4. 
 20. See Helveston, Consumer Protection, supra note 6, at 876; Swedloff, supra note 
6, at 344–45. 
 21. See Swedloff, supra note 6, at 344–45. 
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they are willing to offer coverage.22 Until the modern age, personal line 
insurers making underwriting decisions would collect information directly 
from applicants and analyze it using metrics from their claim experience 
databases. 
The Big Data era has the potential to upset the traditional model in 
two ways. First, the growth of the data collection and brokering industry 
has provided insurers with an inexpensive mechanism for collecting large 
amounts of information about their applicants.23 Given the importance of 
risk-assessment and underwriting in this industry, there are massive 
financial incentives encouraging insurers to incorporate as much data as 
possible into their processes. Whereas insurers in the pre-digital era would 
have to expend substantial resources to collect outside information about 
their applicants and policyholders, cost constitutes a much smaller 
deterrent in a tech-saturated environment. 
Second, the aggregation of massive amounts of consumers’ personal 
data and advancements in AI-driven algorithmic learning have made it 
possible to derive almost limitless correlations between individual 
characteristics and risk.24 In the past insurers were limited to analyzing risk 
correlations between the relatively small set of characteristics that 
applicants provided in the application process and their claims experience. 
Cheap access to seemingly endless amounts of consumer data and 
improvements in AI-driven analytics have created an environment where 
insurers underwriting decisions could be based on AI-controlled analysis 
of a nearly infinite number of data points.25 
As with the changes in advertising, it may appear as though these 
developments are not problematic as they simply assist insurers with 
performing operations that they already do. While it is true that Big Data-
informed insurers will be engaging in the same type of underwriting 
analyses as they had in the past, the vast expansion in the amount of data 
they will be able to access has the potential to harm consumers in new 
ways. As will be explained in greater detail in the following Section, 
insurers expanding their data sources beyond applications and claims 
databases increases the risk that insurers will engage in prohibited forms 
of discrimination and threaten individuals’ liberty interests. 
 
 22. See FEINMAN, supra note 16, at 14–15 (describing insurance companies’ 
underwriting and rate setting operations); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
INSURANCE LAW 96 (4th ed. Lexis Nexis 2012) (same). 
 23. See NYCE, supra note 17, at 5 (describing how predictive analytics can improve 
insurers’ ability to detect risk factors); CORBETT ET AL., supra note 13, at 6 (describing how 
new technologies enabled an auto insurer to collect better data on its customers and identify 
factors that correlate with risk). 
 24. See NYCE, supra note 17, at 5 (describing how predictive analytics can improve 
insurers’ ability to detect risk factors); CORBETT ET AL., supra note 13, at 6. 
 25. See Swedloff, supra note 6, at 344–45. 
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3. Claims Management 
When policyholders file coverage claims with insurance companies, 
their claims are processed by the insurer’s claims management division. 
Given the near uniformity of consumer casualty policies and the similarity 
of most losses, it often is not very difficult to determine whether most 
claims fall inside or outside the scope of coverage. Much of claims 
management groups’ work focuses on resolving disputes with 
policyholders with claims where coverage is legitimately unclear and 
attempting to identify fraudulent claims. While it is easy to assume that 
insurance companies approach the handling of consumers’ claims in a 
good faith manner, history provides a number of high-profile examples 
showing that at least some insurers have used this process to shirk their 
contractual obligations.26 
Just as Big Data will enhance insurers’ underwriting capabilities by 
enabling them to better assess an applicant’s risk of suffering a covered 
loss, it will similarly enhance their claims management capabilities.27 It is 
not clear whether analytics will help insurers to determine whether 
difficult claims fall within coverage. Insurers, however, will be able to use 
internal and external data sources and AI-driven analytics to better predict 
policyholders’ reactions to the insurers’ claims determinations.28 This 
increase in predictive power has the potential to be used in legitimate as 
well as abusive manners. An example of the former would be insurers 
using analytics to improve their fraud detection capabilities. Examples of 
the latter involve insurers using analytics to increase the efficacy of their 
past bad faith practices—predicting which policyholders are least likely to 
contest a wrongful denial of coverage or estimating the amount a 
policyholder with a legitimate claim would be willing to accept to avoid 
having to take legal action.29 
B. How Changes to Insurers’ Practices Could Harm 
Consumers 
Having identified the three areas of insurers’ operations that have the 
greatest potential to change in a Big Data environment, it is now possible 
 
 26. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle Without a 
Name (Yet), 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 4–7 (2012–2013). 
 27. See NYCE, supra note 17, at 5–6 (describing how insurers could use Big Data to 
improve their ability to detect fraudulent claims and prioritize claims in an optimal 
manner). 
 28. See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1008–
17 (2014).   
 29. See Abraham, supra note 26, at 4–7; see also Calo, supra note 28, at 1008–17, 
1031–34. 
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to discuss how new commercial practices could injure consumers’ 
interests. Scholars have identified a number of different ways that the 
introduction of social profiling into commercial markets may harm 
individuals.30 While the dangers associated with the use of consumers’ 
data in markets generally are also applicable to the insurance market, the 
usage of this data by insurers poses additional unique dangers.31 This 
section provides an overview of both the broadly applicable and insurance-
specific harms that unconstrained use of consumer data would cause. 
1. Personal Liberty and Autonomy Norms 
One of the general concerns that commentators have raised about life 
in a Big Data-driven society is that individuals’ freedom of choice will be 
substantially diminished and there will be an increase in the degree to 
which their behaviors will be controlled by the state or private actors. Even 
though all orderly societies restrict their citizens’ behaviors, protecting 
individuals’ personal liberties and ability to make self-directed choices is 
generally regarded as one of the primary virtues that states should pursue. 
Much of existing consumer protection law, for instance, can be viewed as 
promoting individuals’ liberty and autonomy—prohibitions on deceptive 
advertising protect consumers’ decision-making capacity, sanctions for 
bad faith conduct provide a mechanism for holding individuals to their 
promises, etc.32 While all transactional agreements place constraints on 
each of the contracting parties’ autonomy, the state has attempted to 
protect consumers by prohibiting commercial practices that it has deemed 
go too far in impairing their interests.33 
Commercial uses of analytics will impair personal liberty and 
autonomy in two ways. First, the mere existence of the analytics 
infrastructure will affect the decisions that consumers make in their private 
(i.e., non-commercial) lives. Businesses’ interest in analytics has already 
created massive demand for consumer data. The collection of this data 
requires entities to watch and record individuals’ behaviors, a role that a 
variety of different types of companies have stepped into.34 These 
companies’ acts of surveillance (as well as growing societal awareness that 
 
 30. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 5, at 1; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 
5, at 96–109; Schmitz, supra note 5, at 1411; Zarsky, supra note 5, at 1375. 
 31. See Helveston, Consumer Protection, supra note 6, at 862; Swedloff, supra note 
6, at 344. 
 32. See, e.g., Max Helveston & Michael Jacobs, The Incoherent Role of Bargaining 
Power in Contract Law, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1017, 1050–56 (2014) (describing 
commercial practices that have been prohibited through common law, legislative, and 
regulatory measures). 
 33. Id. 
 34. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 7–9 (2014) [hereinafter FTC, DATA BROKERS]. 
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their actions are being watched) have the potential to drastically alter 
individuals’ behaviors. 
Insurance companies’ ability to discriminate among consumers when 
selling their product substantially enhances the likelihood that their use of 
analytics will influence consumers’ noncommercial behaviors. Unlike 
most businesses, the law permits insurers to exert a large degree of control 
over whom they sell their services to.35 Insurers can refuse to sell policies 
to individuals that their underwriting procedures deem to be bad risks. 
Alternatively, they can increase the price of their products to account for 
applicants’ perceived level of risk.36 Because insurers are able to engage 
in these behaviors, they have the ability to create behavioral incentives that 
could influence potential consumers’ decisions. 
For example, assume that several auto insurance companies have 
analyzed large amounts of consumer data and found a strong correlation 
between purchases of highly-caffeinated drinks at gas stations and 
highway collisions. This information would cause these insurers to begin 
to incorporate this correlation into their underwriting and pricing models, 
causing them to either deny policies to, or charge higher premiums to, 
anyone that the insurer knows makes such purchases. If these insurers’ 
practices became public knowledge, it is likely that individuals would 
avoid purchasing highly-caffeinated drinks at gas stations (or, at a 
minimum, make sure they pay for such purchases in ways that could be 
not traced back to them). Similar examples could be constructed that 
would discourage consumers from engaging in wholly non-commercial 
activities. 
While it is possible that insurers’ use of analytics could impair 
consumer autonomy in this way, there are reasons to believe that the 
impact of these practices will be relatively minimal. The primary problem 
with the causal mechanism outlined above is that it assumes that 
consumers will become aware of the behaviors that will factor into 
potential insurers’ underwriting processes. Insurers consider their 
underwriting and pricing methodologies to be closely guarded secrets, so 
public discovery of this type of information is unlikely. Perhaps more 
important, however, is the fact that the underwriting decisions of Big Data-
empowered insurers will be dictated by AI-derived algorithms that are 
 
 35. Cf. Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race 
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1277–1284 (2017) 
(providing a background of laws prohibiting commercial entities from discriminating 
among consumers). 
 36. Cf. Robert M. Weiss & Ajay K. Mehrotra, Online Dynamic Pricing: Efficiency, 
Equity and the Future of E-Commerce, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, *1–4 (2001) (discussing 
“the historical, economic, and legal aspects” of flexible pricing). 
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functionally black boxes.37 If insurers, much less consumers, are unaware 
of what behaviors affect their determinations, then it is hard to see how 
consumers’ autonomy would be constrained in this way. 
Second, commercial analytics will harm individuals’ liberty and 
autonomy interests by encouraging insurers to increase the degree to 
which their policies control policyholders’ behaviors. While most 
businesses have little interest in influencing individuals’ conduct outside 
of the context of their product or service, the long-term and 
indemnification-centered nature of insurance agreements creates 
incentives for insurers to attempt to assert a greater degree of control over 
consumers’ behaviors.38 As insurers tap into previously inaccessible data, 
they will be able to identify more factors that bear on the likelihood a 
policyholder will suffer a loss. Once insurers have this knowledge, they 
will have strong financial incentives pushing them to compel 
policyholders to engage in risk-reducing behaviors. 
Insurers regularly structure their consumer policies in ways that 
compel or encourage policyholders to take certain actions. For example, 
an insurance company could make coverage for a household contingent on 
the policyholder agreeing to maintain fire detection/extinguishing 
equipment or provide for a premium reduction if the policyholder installs 
security cameras.39 The scope of the coverage offered by insurers’ policies 
can also directly influence policyholders’ behaviors. Insurers regularly 
issue homeowner’s policies that exclude or limit the amount of coverage 
for losses that are due to the policyholder engaging in particular activities 
(e.g., having a certain breed of dog, storing certain chemicals in their 
house).40 
Whether these types of insurer-imposed controls over policyholder 
behavior constitute objectionable infringements on consumer autonomy 
primarily depends on the conduct that the insurer is targeting. 
Traditionally, insurers have targeted behaviors that have a clear 
connection to the insured-against risk and that are not regarded as 
 
 37. Swedloff, supra note 6, at 343–44. 
 38. See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto 
to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1418–30 (2014) (describing 
how insurers regulate policyholders’ behavior to reduce risk of loss); Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 197, 206–12 (2012) (same). 
 39. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 38, at 1418–30; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra 
note 38, at 206–12.  
 40. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 38, at 1418–30; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra 
note 38, at 206–12; see also Larry Cunningham, The Case Against Dog Breed 
Discrimination By Homeowners’ Insurance Companies, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 4–5, 11–17 
(2004–2005). 
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infringing upon individuals’ zone of personal liberty.41 For instance, 
insurers providing small business owners with property and general 
liability coverages might require the owner to install sprinkler systems and 
retain security personnel.42 Both of these requirements have apparent 
relationships with the risks being insured against and neither compel the 
policyholder to take actions that most would regard as falling within the 
personal sphere. 
While policyholders have found the majority of the actions required 
by insurers to be unobjectionable, this has not uniformly been the case. 
When insurance companies have adopted behavior-forcing practices that 
do not clearly satisfy both of these criteria, consumers have argued that 
they were being unfairly coercive. When a disability insurer began 
refusing to issue policies to individuals who disclosed that they were 
taking an HIV-prevention medicine there was prompt public backlash 
against the company.43 Denying insurance coverage to individuals due to 
their decision to take a prophylactic medicine clearly intrudes on 
individuals’ zone of liberty, as well as being questionable under the direct-
relationship test. Similarly, there has been robust criticism of companies 
that have refused to issue homeowners’ coverage to individuals with pets 
of certain species or breeds.44 Not only is it unclear whether there is 
actually a direct connection between owning these particular types of pets 
and increased risk of loss, but these practices impair individuals’ ability to 
engage in personal conduct that the law permits.45 
As insurers incorporate Big Data analytics into their operations, the 
concern is that they will increase the degree to which they seek to regulate 
policyholder behaviors and will do so in ways that constrain individuals’ 
personal freedoms.46 The digital revolution and the growing accessibility 
 
 41. What interests constitute protected liberty interests has never been exhaustively 
determined, but several specific examples have been identified in case law. See, e.g., Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 42. These types of promises typically appear in the endorsements that insurers attach 
to the policies they issue to customers. Endorsements add additional terms to the policy, 
expanding or limiting the coverage set forth in the policy. See, e.g., Am. Way Cellular v. 
Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Indus. 
Dev. Ass’n v. Commercial Union Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 536 A.2d 787, 789–90 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); Holz Rubber Co. v. Am. Star Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 1055, 1059–
61 (Cal. 1975) (en banc); Port Blakely Mill Co. v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 
P. 194, 194–96 (Wash. 1910). 
 43. Donald G. McNeil Jr., He Took a Drug to Prevent AIDS. Then He Couldn’t Get 
Diability Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/02/12/health/truvada-hiv-insurance.html. 
 44. See Cunningham, supra note 40, at 4–5, 11–17. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Jay Stanley, The Potential Chilling Effects of Big Data, ACLU BLOG (Apr. 
30, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/potential-chilling-effects-
big-data; see also Bill Davidow, Redlining for the 21st Century, ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2014), 
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of data will allow insurers to discover increasingly indirect correlations 
between individual characteristics and risk. Competitive pressures will 
push insurers to incorporate these correlations into their underwriting and 
contract design practices. While some of these behavior-modifying 
changes will be unobjectionable, it is likely that others will intrude on the 
personal spheres of consumers. An example of this already beginning to 
occur can be found in reports that some insurers have debated whether 
they should require individuals seeking homeowner’s coverage to install 
monitoring equipment in their homes.47 
2. Anti-discrimination Norms 
Another concern that has been raised about the integration of Big 
Data analytics into consumer markets is that it will result in increased 
discrimination against certain classes of individuals. The multitude of anti-
discrimination48 and public accommodation laws49 currently in force 
establish that modern society embraces anti-discrimination norms in the 
commercial sphere. While there is variance in which personal qualities are 
protected in different contexts, it is clear that attempts by commercial 
actors to treat consumers differently on the basis of immutable or deeply 
personal (e.g., religious affiliation, marital status) characteristics are 
generally viewed unfavorably. 
There are reasons to believe that these anti-discrimination norms are 
particularly strong in the domain of insurance. Insurance companies are 
no different than other commercial entities in that they have had to comply 
with state and federal laws that generally proscribe discriminating among 
consumers in particular ways. Regulators in many states have 
supplemented these laws by imposing additional anti-discrimination rules 
in the insurance context.50 Even though some consider the laws governing 
 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/03/redlining-for-the-21st-
century/284235 (describing prohibitions against redlining and how Big Data could lead to 
unfair discrimination in the commercial sector). 
 47. See ERNST & YOUNG, 2013 U.S. PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE OUTLOOK 5 
(2012) (“While the automobile lines of business are the initial beneficiaries of Big Data, 
opportunities are emerging in homeowners insurance (among others), with video monitors, 
security systems and gaming systems all collecting and transmitting usable data.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. ch. 14 (2012 
& Supp. 2017); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ch. 21, subch. VI (2012 
& Supp. 2017); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. ch. 126 (2012 & Supp. 
2017). 
 49. Joshua Block, Businesses Do Not Have a License to Discriminate, ACLU BLOG 
(Dec. 18, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights-free-speech-religion-belief/ 
businesses-do-not-have-license-discriminate (describing state public accommodation 
laws). 
 50. See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 
S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 232–62 (2014) (collecting state anti-discrimination laws). 
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insurers’ conduct to be insufficiently robust, 51 it is clear that existing legal 
structures impose limits on insurers’ ability to treat consumers differently. 
Scholars have raised doubts about the degree to which insurance 
companies comply with existing anti-discrimination laws.52 Few, if any, 
of these claims allege that insurers are intentionally discriminating against 
members of protected classes because of their membership in that class. 
The most common concern that has been raised is that insurers are 
indirectly discriminating against protected classes when they base their 
decisions on criteria that are highly correlated with protected class 
membership.53 
If insurers incorporate Big Data analytics into their operations in the 
manners described earlier, it will become more likely that they will treat 
individuals differently in ways that appear to be based on protected 
characteristics. The basic premise underlying AI-driven analytics is that 
computers are able to analyze incredible amounts of data and identify 
relationships that would have been difficult to impossible to detect through 
other means. In the context of underwriting, this would involve using 
artificial intelligence to find relationships between policyholder-related 
(or location-related) data and the likelihood that a loss covered by the 
insurance policy will occur. The specific algorithm derived from this 
analysis would be dynamic, with the formula being constantly updated to 
account for new data.54 It is important to note that the algorithms created 
 
 51. See id. at 197–99, 267 (“Our findings reveal various discrepancies between the 
reality of state insurance antidiscrimination law and the largely theoretical literature on the 
topic. . . . [S]uch laws often have little to say about the most important and divisive types 
of discrimination: distinctions based on race, national origin, or religion.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. 
REV. 517, 517 (1983) (discussing general tactics insurers can use to discriminate without 
violating anti-discrimination laws); Mary L. Heen, Nondiscrimination in Insurance: The 
Next Chapter, 49 GA. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (2014); Alan I. Widiss, To Insure or Not To Insure 
Persons Infected with the Virus that Causes AIDS, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1617, 1658–64 (1992) 
(describing how insurers could legally discriminate against sexual and racial minorities via 
HIV testing); Robert Pear, Health Insurers Skirt New Law, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Oct. 5, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/05/us/health-insurers-skirting-new-law-
officials-report.html (describing how health insurers were able to skirt laws intended to 
protect sick individuals); see also Jessica Mason Pieklo, Four Insurance Companies 
Accused of Widespread Sex Discrimination, REWIRE.NEWS (Jan. 17, 2014), 
https://rewire.news/article/2014/01/17/four-insurance-companies-accused-widespread-
sex-discrimination/. 
 53. See, e.g., Katy Chi-Wen Li, The Private Insurance Industry’s Tactics Against 
Suspected Homosexuals: Redlining Based on Occupation, Residence and Marital Status, 
22 AM. J.L. & MED. 477, 479–80 (1996); Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and 
the Discriminatory Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 
609–16 (1996). 
 54. See Thomas H. Davenport, Industrial-Strength Analytics with Machine Learning, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2013), http:// http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/09/11/industrial-
strength-analytics-with-machine-learning/. 
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by AI-driven analytics are essentially black boxes—there is no way to 
know what characteristics the formula is taking into consideration when 
making a prediction.55 
In the pre-analytics environment, an insurer that wished to comply 
with anti-discrimination laws could simply review the criteria they used to 
make a decision and make sure that none of its factors targeted (or served 
as a proxy for) a protected class. It is unclear how insurers relying on AI-
derived algorithms will be able to do the same.56 Further, given the nature 
of machine learning, it seems probable that at least some of the 
characteristics that the algorithm operates on will be strongly correlated 
with an individual’s membership in a protected class.57 
In summary, analytics-driven insurers will be more likely to violate 
broadly held anti-discrimination norms. If AI-derived algorithms begin to 
play a primary role in insurers’ operations, then it is likely that these 
companies’ advertising, underwriting, and claims handling practices will 
treat individuals differently in ways that correlate strongly to protected 
characteristics. 
3. Egalitarianism Norms 
While equality-centered norms do not play a substantial role in most 
commercial markets, they can be found in insurance markets. This can be 
attributed to the fact that insurers, unlike most vendors, are permitted to 
discriminate against consumers in ways that are not permitted in other 
contexts. Throughout the academic literature on the function and 
regulation of insurance markets one can find discussions about when and 
how insurers should be allowed to deny individuals access to insurance or 
charge different rates to those possessing certain characteristics.58 Similar 
debates exist about whether the ideal insurance system would be one that 
charges all policyholders actuarially accurate rates or one that spreads risk 
in a way that mitigates differences in individuals’ risk profiles that are 
 
 55. Swedloff, supra note 6, at 363 (“The far more likely scenario is that it will not be 
readily apparent to anyone why some individuals are charged more. The algorithms driving 
big data will simply spit out higher prices for some policyholders than others.”). 
 56. Swedloff, supra note 6, at 370–71 (describing the types of analyses regulatory 
bodies would have to do to detect this form of discrimination); Solon Barocas & Andrew 
D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 712 (“Data mining allows 
employers who wish to discriminate on the basis of a protected class to disclaim any 
knowledge of the protected class in the first instance . . . .”). 
 57. Swedloff, supra note 6, at 370. 
 58. See Avraham et al., supra note 50, at 232–62 (discussing limitations on insurers’ 
ability to discriminate against consumers). 
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attributable to luck (or other factors that an individual did not choose).59 
Regardless of which view one subscribes to, it is clear that changes in the 
insurance industry that caused it to be less egalitarian would cause a 
substantial harm to many consumers. 
The use of Big Data analytics in insurers’ operations could result in 
a system that exacerbates individuals’ luck-based characteristics. As 
insurance companies’ algorithms include larger and larger numbers of 
correlations between risk and individual qualities, it will become more 
likely that an insurers’ interactions with a consumer will be driven by 
factors that the consumer had little to no control over. Many of the 
qualities that AI-driven analytics might identify as increasing the 
likelihood that a policyholder will experience a loss (or submit a fraudulent 
claim) are things that are immutable, luck-based, or otherwise non-
elected.60 Using these characteristics as criteria for determining which 
individuals receive preferential treatment would lead insurers to violate 
fairness norms by treating some consumers better than others on the basis 
of fortuity alone.61 
While insurers treating individuals differently on these grounds 
would in and of itself be contrary to equality norms, the potential harm 
associated with these practices is much greater. This is because many of 
the non-elected characteristics that would flag an individual as being a 
greater risk to an insurer are also qualities that put individuals at a 
disadvantage in society generally.62 It is likely that the converse is true as 
well—qualities indicating individuals present a low risk also provide 
individuals with societal advantages.63 As a hypothetical example, if 
individuals that are born into high-poverty areas are more likely to be 
involved in a car accident due to another driver’s negligence and an auto 
insurers’ algorithm charges higher rates to individuals who have been in 
prior accidents regardless of their fault, then that insurer’s practices will 
exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the impact that consumers’ unelected 
characteristics will have on their lives.64 
 
 59. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–17 (1974) (describing modern 
conception about the relationship of justice, desert, and morality); Heen, supra note 52, at 
10–23.  
 60. Helveston, Consumer Protection, supra note 6, at 896. 
 61. Id. at 895–97. 
 62. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, 
PRESERVING VALUES 46–47 (May 2014), https://bit.ly/2HQiQrw (expressing concern that 
businesses using analytics to discriminate among customers will hurt the least well off). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Swedloff, supra note 6, at 348–51. Insurers’ practices already take some of 
these types of characteristics into account when making pricing and underwriting 
decisions, but the data revolution could drastically expand the number of such qualities that 
factor into an individual’s ability to procure insurance. 
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4. Good Faith Norms 
A final market norm that could be injured by insurers’ use of Big 
Data analytics is the basic presumption that commercial entities will deal 
with consumers fairly and honor their contractual obligations. The idea 
that both parties in a contractual relationship have an obligation to fully 
perform their end of the bargain is one of the fundamental ideas in modern 
society.65 This is particularly true in the context of consumer contracts, 
where the law has attempted to protect individuals from being exploited 
by more sophisticated commercial entities.66 One example of how the legal 
system has done this is by policing businesses’ attempts to take actions 
that, while technically within the bounds of their agreement, constitute 
unfair abuses of discretion.67 
The terms of insurance contracts make insurers’ obligations to cover 
policyholder losses dependent on several conditions being met, while also 
vesting insurers with the authority to determine whether those conditions 
have been satisfied. This structure ends up providing insurers with a large 
degree of discretion over when their performance obligations are 
triggered. Once a policyholder has filed a claim, an insurer can determine 
that the claim is fully covered, that only certain aspects of the claim will 
be covered, that the claim falls outside of coverage, that the loss was 
covered but the policyholder’s failure to perform their contractual duties 
vitiated coverage, etc. One of the longstanding issues in insurance 
regulation has been how the state should make sure that insurers are not 
using unfair claims handling practices to shortchange policyholders.68 
More specifically, scholars and regulators have raised concerns that absent 
regulatory measures, insurers will abuse consumers’ lack of knowledge 
and the high transaction costs that consumers must incur to contest 
 
 65. See Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality 
Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1033 
(2003) (“The implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing has been adopted by the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, is implied into every contract governed by the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and in most jurisdictions is implied into every contract at common 
law.”); James A. Webster, Comment, A Pound of Flesh: The Oregon Supreme Court 
Virtually Eliminates the Duty to Perform and Enforce Contracts in Good Faith, 75 OR. L. 
REV. 493, 497–509 (1996) (discussing the history of the good faith contractual obligation). 
 66. See Helveston & Jacobs, supra note 32, at 1017.  
 67. See Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) 
Empty Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5–12 (2005). 
 68. See, e.g., Whitney R. Mauldin, Good Business/Bad Faith: Why the Insurance 
Industry Should Adopt a Good Faith Model, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 151, 159 
(2008). See generally Hugh A. Linstrom, Unfair Claims Settlement Practices: A Summary 
of California Law, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 691 (1994); FEINMAN, supra note 16. 
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insurers’ determinations to get away with awarding policyholders less than 
they are entitled to, or denying legitimate claims entirely.69 
Once insurers begin utilizing Big Data analytics to improve their 
claims management systems, there is a substantial risk that they will act in 
ways that violate good faith norms. Consumer analytics will not only 
enable insurers to get a better idea of which individuals pose larger risks 
than others, but will also allow them to identify individuals that are more 
or less likely to contest an insurers’ finding that their claim is not 
covered.70 Insurers with this type of knowledge will be able to adopt 
abusive claims management practices, wherein they intentionally deny the 
valid coverage claims (or offer policyholders less than they are entitled to) 
of individual they know are unlikely to bring suit against the insurer. While 
the good-natured might believe that insurers would never engage in this 
type of conduct, there have been several examples of companies doing 
essentially the same acts.71 
III. PART II - STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF 
CONSUMER DATA 
This Part provide a description of three of the most important laws 
that limit commercial entities’ possession and use of consumer data. Each 
law was enacted by different legislative bodies—the California Consumer 
Privacy Act was passed by the California state legislature, the Vermont 
Data Broker Act was passed by the Vermont legislature, and the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act was enacted by the federal legislature—and each 
targets significantly different conduct. After providing an overview of 
each law and analyzing how it constrains insurance companies’ conduct, 
Part III will assess whether these laws are sufficient to address the 
concerns identified in Part I and discuss how regulatory shortfalls should 
be addressed. 
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act72 (“FCRA”) was enacted by Congress 
in 1970. The statute’s statement of purpose provides that the FCRA was 
meant to ensure that inaccurate credit reports would not “directly impair 
the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods 
[would not] undermine the public confidence which is essential to the 
 
 69. See supra note 68.  
 70. See Calo, supra note 28, at 1008–17, 1031–34. 
 71. See Abraham, supra note 26, at 7.  
 72. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x).  
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continued functioning of the banking system.”73 In order to achieve this 
goal, the FCRA establishes a set of rules meant to “insure that consumer 
reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, 
impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.”74 
The FCRA operates by categorizing entities that collect certain types 
of consumer information as “credit reporting agencies” (“CRAs”) and then 
placing restrictions on the conduct of CRAs as well as any companies that 
use information that is provided by a CRA. It also imposes requirements 
on entities that provide information to CRAs.75 The FCRA defines a 
“credit reporting agency” as an entity that regularly “assembl[es] or 
evaluat[es] consumer credit information or other information on 
consumers for the purposes of furnishing consumer reports to third 
parties” and uses any means of interstate commerce when doing so.76 The 
act’s definition of “consumer reports” provides context on the types of 
information that the act is concerned with regulating. A “consumer report” 
is first defined as any communication “by a consumer reporting agency 
bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, 
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of 
living.”77 Communications of these types only qualify as consumer 
reports, however, if they are “used or expected to be used . . . as a factor 
in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for (A) credit or insurance to be 
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (B) 
employment purposes; or (C) any other purpose authorized under [another 
section of the act].”78 
The FCRA limits consumer reporting agencies’ ability to sell 
consumer data. It prohibits agencies from providing third parties with 
consumer reports unless the disclosure falls under one of the statute’s 
authorized purposes.79 Most relevant for purposes of this discussion are 
the provisions allowing consumer reports to be provided “[t]o a person 
which [the consumer reporting agency] has reason to believe . . . (C) 
intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of 
insurance involving the consumer; or . . . (F) otherwise has a legitimate 
business need for the information (i) in connection with a business 
transaction that is initiated by the consumer; or (ii) to review an account 
to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the 
 
 73. Id. § 602(a)(1), 84 Stat. at 1128. 
 74. Id. § 602(a)(4), 84 Stat. at 1128. 
 75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 77. Id. § 1681a(d)(1). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
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account.”80 The act further specifies that a consumer report can only be 
furnished in connection with an insurance transaction that is not initiated 
by the consumer if the consumer provides their consent or “the transaction 
consists of a firm offer of . . . insurance.”81 
The part of the FCRA that is most relevant to the concerns raised in 
Part I are the requirements the statute imposes on entities that use 
consumer report information. If an individual takes an “adverse action” 
against a consumer on the basis of information contained in a consumer 
report the act requires the individual to provide that consumer with a 
notice.82 The notice must inform the consumer of the adverse action taken, 
the contact information for the CRA that furnished the consumer report, a 
statement that the CRA did not take the adverse action, and a summary of 
the consumer’s right to obtain a copy of their consumer report from the 
CRA as well as their right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any 
information in the CRA’s consumer report.83 While the act also contains 
requirements for entities that take adverse actions against consumers based 
on information obtained from non-CRAs, these provisions only apply to 
entities making credit (not insurance) related decisions.84 Finally, the 
FCRA requires that insurers that make offers of insurance to individuals 
on the basis of information contained in a consumer report include certain 
disclosures in their offers and mandates that they maintain files describing 
the basis on which offers were made.85 
The extent to which the FCRA limits insurance companies’ ability to 
incorporate Big Data analytics into their operations depends on the 
resolution of a few key issues. First, what constraints does the FCRA put 
on insurers’ use of information purchased from the types of data brokers 
discussed in Part I? Second, when an insurer uses information from a 
consumer report, what types of behaviors would constitute an “adverse 
action” against a consumer? Third, what penalties would insurers face if 
they violate the FCRA? 
Whether the FCRA will affect the use of Big Data analytics in the 
consumer insurance industry largely depends on whether the data insurers 
purchase from brokers are considered consumer reports. If the data counts 
as a consumer report, then insurers will be subject to the FCRA’s 
 
 80. Id. § 1681b(a)(3). 
 81. Id. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i). If a consumer report is being disclosed in connection with 
a firm offer of insurance, then there are additional requirements that must be met (e.g., that 
the consumer reporting agency has complied with the FRCA’s opt-out requirements). See 
id. § 1681b(c)(2). 
 82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 83. See id. § 1681m(a). 
 84. See id. § 1681m(b)(1). 
 85. See id. § 1681m(d). 
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restrictions on the procurement and use of this information. If the data does 
not count as a consumer report, then the FCRA poses no barrier. 
As a matter of first impression, it would appear as though insurers 
purchasing consumer data from brokers would constitute a sale of a 
consumer report. Such data would certain be a “communication . . . 
bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit capacity, character, 
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living” and the 
data would be “used or expected to be used . . . as a factor in establishing 
the consumer’s eligibility for . . . credit or insurance . . . [or] 
employment.”86 
There are two problems with this analysis. First, in order for a 
transmission of data to qualify as a consumer report, it must be sold by an 
entity that is a consumer reporting agency.87 The definitions of consumer 
report and consumer reporting agency are interdependent, as the primary 
defining characteristic of an agency is that it “regularly engages in . . . the 
practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other 
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports 
to third parties.”88 Digital data brokers do not appear to categorically 
qualify as consumer reporting agencies. The FTC has only filed FCRA 
enforcement actions against a limited number of data brokers.89 In its 
complaints, the agency has argued that these data brokers were CRAs 
because they marketed their products in ways that meant the brokers knew 
their information would be used in making employment decisions.90 The 
fact that the FTC has only pursued actions against certain data brokers 
indicates that the agency believes that the remainder do not engage in 
activities that would cause them to be CRAs and, hence, any data they sell 
cannot be considered a consumer report. 
Second, for at least some of the ways that insurers might seek to use 
this data, it does not appear as though insurers would be using this data as 
“a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility” for insurance. For 
instance, an insurer could purchase large amounts of consumer data from 
data brokers and exclusively use that data to create algorithms and profile 
individuals for marketing or claims management purposes. Further, 
because the definition of consumer report requires there to be a direct 
connection between the data communicated and a determination of a 
specific individual’s eligibility for insurance, it is possible that insurers 
 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (2012 & Supp. 2017).  
 87. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT 
REPORTING ACT 1 (July 2011), https://bit.ly/2n9mkXt [hereinafter FTC, FAIR CREDIT 
REPORTING ACT]. 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 
 89. See FTC, BIG DATA, supra note 13, at 14. 
 90. Id. 
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could use this data to create their general underwriting algorithms. This 
interpretation is supported by a Federal Trade Commission report stating 
that “[i]nformation that does not identify a specific consumer does not 
constitute a consumer report even if the communication is used in part to 
determine eligibility.”91 
The foregoing establishes that insurers will not be limited by the 
FCRA when purchasing information from data brokers and engaging in 
certain types of analytics. The FCRA will, however, apply to at least one 
type of conduct—insurers purchasing an individual’s information for use 
when making underwriting determinations for that specific individual. 
Indeed, there have been several lawsuits against insurers alleging that they 
failed to satisfy the FCRA’s requirements for entities that use consumer 
report information when underwriting. 
Many of the FCRA-based claims brought against insurers have 
alleged that the insurers failed to provide consumers with a required 
adverse action notice. While the statute contains a relatively clear 
definition of “adverse action,”92 in the insurance context, whether specific 
insurer actions constitute adverse actions has been a hotly contested 
matter. The Supreme Court of the United States addressed this issue in 
Safeco Insurance Co. v. Burr.93 In Safeco, the central dispute was whether 
an insurer was required to provide an adverse action notice when it issued 
an initial coverage offer to a consumer with a rate that was negatively 
affected by information in a consumer report.94 The Court held that 
insurers must give adverse action notices even on initial policies if the rate 
the insurer charges is more than what the insurer would have charged in 
the absence of any of the information in the consumer report.95 Thus, it is 
clear that the FCRA does impose some requirements on insurers in the 
underwriting context. 
An insurer that violates the FCRA can find itself the subject of both 
administrative and civil enforcement actions. For administrative actions, 
the Federal Trade Commission has primary enforcement authority and is 
explicitly authorized to file civil suits against individuals that knowingly 
violate the act.96 Courts can assess penalties of up to $2,500 per violation, 
taking into account factors such as the violator’s degree of culpability, 
 
 91. FTC, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, supra note 87, at 20. Given this interpretation, 
it appears that whether the FCRA permits insurers to do this depends on if the insurer could 
reasonably link the data supplied by the broker back to specific consumers. 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i). 
 93. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007). 
 94. See id. at 59–61. 
 95. See id. at 61–62. 
 96. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
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history of similar conduct, and ability to pay.97 Other federal and state 
actors have limited authority to pursue violations of the act.98 
The FCRA has two civil enforcement provisions that consumers 
could use to bring actions against insurers. First, individuals are authorized 
to bring civil suits alleging that an insurer negligently failed to comply 
with the act’s requirements.99 If successful, they would be able to recover 
“any actual damages sustained . . . as a result of the failure . . . [and] the 
costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined 
by the court.”100 Second, individuals can bring claims alleging that an 
insurer willfully failed to comply with the act’s requirements.101 In order 
for a violation to be willful, it must be shown that the insurer’s reading of 
the statute was objectively unreasonable.102 If successful, a claimant would 
be able to recover “any actual damages sustained . . . as a result of the 
failure . . . of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000,” attorney’s 
fees, costs, and “such amount of punitive damages as the court may 
allow.”103 It should be noted that the FCRA explicitly exempts individuals 
from being held liable for violating the requirements placed on users of 
consumer reports if they can show “by a preponderance of the evidence 
that at the time of the alleged violation he maintained reasonable 
procedures to assure compliance.”104 
B. The California Consumer Privacy Act 
The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”) was signed 
into law by California Governor Jerry Brown on June 28th, 2018.105 The 
legislation’s stated goal is “to further Californians’ right to privacy by 
giving consumers an effective way to control their personal 
information”106 and has been hailed as the most expansive privacy 
legislation in US history.107 In recognition of the expansive requirements 
that the act places on commercial entities, the law has provided individuals 
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with a substantial period of time to bring their operations in compliance 
with its rules.108 
The CCPA seeks to protect individuals’ privacy rights by providing 
California citizens with a number of distinct rights. It grants consumers 
the right to know what personal information is being collected about them, 
as well as the right to know whether their personal information is sold or 
disclosed and to whom. Further, it requires that companies allow 
consumers to access personal information the business possesses about 
them. Finally, it empowers individuals to prevent companies from selling 
their personal information and guarantees that those that exercise their 
privacy rights will be given equal services and prices as those who do 
not.109 
The act’s two primary mechanisms for giving individuals these rights 
are the imposition of disclosure and access requirements on business 
entities that collect consumer data and the recognition that individuals 
have pseudo-property rights in their personal data. The CCPA’s disclosure 
and access requirements are similar in kind to those of the FCRA. Any 
business that collects a consumer’s personal information must, before or 
at the time of collection, disclose the types of data it is collecting and how 
it will use the information.110 Additionally, companies must provide a 
consumer with a mechanism for making a “verifiable consumer request”111 
and, upon receiving such a request, must provide information about the 
data it possesses on the consumer.112 
The act grants consumers rights that allow them to control how others 
may and may not use their personal information. First, the CCPA 
authorizes individuals to demand that companies delete any personal 
information about themselves that they possess.113 There are important 
exceptions to the right to deletion—for example, companies are not 
required to delete consumer data if it is needed for statutorily-specified 
purposes,114 which include businesses using the data internally for 
purposes that are consistent “with the context in which the consumer 
provided the information” or “reasonably aligned with” consumer 
expectations.115 Second, the CCPA requires businesses that sell 
consumers’ personal information to provide a conspicuous means for 
individuals to opt-out of the sale of their information and to immediately 
 
 108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.198 (West 2019).  
 109. Assemb. B 375, § 2(i).  
 110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(b) (West 2019). 
 111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.130 (West 2019). 
 112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(c). 
 113. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a)–(c) (West 2019).  
 114. Id. § 1798.105(d). 
 115. Id. § 1798.105(d)(7), (9). 
 2019 REINING IN COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION 691 
comply with any requests they receive.116 Third, the act forbids companies 
that purchase a consumer’s data from selling that data to other parties 
unless the consumer is provided notice of the proposed sale and consents 
to the transaction.117 Finally, the CCPA prohibits companies from 
discriminating against consumers that exercise the rights created by the 
act.118 It explicitly identifies price discrimination and refusals to deal as 
practices that are not permitted.119 Perhaps paradoxically, however, the act 
appears to allow businesses to offer individuals financial incentives to 
consent to the collection and sale of their data.120 These rights constitute a 
substantial departure from how the law has traditionally treated personal 
data, as they grant consumers’ a property-like interest in their personal 
information. 
The CCPA defines “personal information” in an expansive manner. 
Any information that “identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being 
associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with 
a particular consumer or household[]” qualifies as personal information.121 
A non-exhaustive list of examples includes “[i]dentifiers such as real 
name, alias, . . . unique personal identifier, [and] online identifier[] 
Internet Protocol address,”122 “Internet or other electronic network activity 
information, including . . . browsing history, search history, and 
information regarding a consumer’s interaction with an Internet Web site, 
application, or advertisement[,]”123 and “[i]nferences drawn from any of 
the other information identified in this subdivision to create a profile about 
a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences, characteristics, 
psychological trends, predispositions, behaviors, attitudes, intelligence, 
abilities, and aptitudes.”124 The act explicitly notes that information that is 
publicly available from government records does not count as personal 
information.125 
While the CCPA is a California state law, the act’s requirements will 
end up applying to a substantial number of out-of-state and international 
businesses.126 The key issue when determining whether an entity falls 
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within the scope of the CCPA is whether it qualifies as a “business.” Under 
the act a company constitutes a “business” if it satisfies two elements: 
(1) it is a for-profit business “that collects consumers’ personal 
information, or on the behalf of which such information is 
collected and that . . . determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of consumers’ personal information, that does business 
in the State of California,” and 
(2) (a) has gross annual revenues in excess of $25,000,000; (b) 
annually buys, receives for the business’ commercial purposes, 
sells, or shares for commercial purposes the personal information 
of 50,000 or more consumers, households, or devices; or (c) 
derives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from selling 
consumers’ personal information.127 
This definition means that essentially all data brokers and every large 
insurer that does business in California will fall within the scope of the 
CCPA. 
Finally, the CCPA is designed to be primarily enforced by the 
California attorney general. The law grants enforcement powers to the 
state attorney general and authorizes civil penalties ranging from $2,500 
to $7,500 per violation of the act.128 The CCPA also authorizes consumers 
to bring actions against businesses that fail to comply with specific 
statutory requirements. This private right of action, however, is rather 
limited, as individuals can only bring data breach claims.129 These include 
allegations that a company failed to implement “reasonable security 
procedures and practices” and that this failure led to “unauthorized access 
and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure” of their personal information.130 
Courts are limited to awarding damages of actual damages or no less than 
$100 and no more than $750 per violation.131 
Whether the CCPA will effectively prevent abusive uses of Big Data 
analytics in the consumer insurance industry depends on a variety of 
factors. First, there is the issue concerning which businesses will fall 
within its scope. Based on the statute’s definition of business, it is clear 
that any company that primarily engages in the collection and sale of 
consumer data (i.e., data brokers) and does business in California will be 
required to comply with its rules. Most insurers selling consumer lines in 
California are also likely to qualify as CCPA businesses. The majority of 
consumer policies sold in the state are issued by for-profit businesses and 
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as part of their standard operations insurers collect and use consumers’ 
personal information. While some insurers may be exempt because they 
have gross annual revenues that are less than $25,000,000 and do not 
receive the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, many of 
the larger companies will qualify under one (or both) of these criteria. 
The prevalence of individuals exercising the rights granted by the 
CCPA is a second issue that will be important. For example, if very few 
people opt-out from data brokers being able to sell their information to 
third-parties, then the CCPA will not pose a barrier to insurers’ acquisition 
of consumer data. Conversely, if large numbers of individual opt-out, then 
insurers’ only means for getting this information would be to collect it 
themselves. 
The frequency with which individuals invoke the right to deletion and 
how the statutory exceptions to this right are interpreted will also play a 
large role in determining the law’s effectiveness. While the CCPA grants 
consumers the ability to have businesses delete any of the consumer’s 
personal information they possess, the optional nature of this right means 
that its impact will depend substantially on how often it is exercised. 
Further, the CCPA allows companies to keep consumer data even if a 
deletion request is made if “it is necessary for the business or service 
provider to maintain the consumer’s personal information in order to . . . 
protect against malicious, deceptive, fraudulent, or illegal activity . . . [or 
t]o enable solely internal uses that are reasonably aligned with the 
expectations of the consumer based on the consumer’s relationship with 
the business.”132 The exact meaning of these statutory exceptions is 
unclear and they could be interpreted in ways that would allow insurance 
companies to hold on to any consumer data it possesses that it can link to 
its underwriting, pricing, or fraud detection operations. 
A final issue that will directly impact the degree to which the CCPA 
impairs insurers’ use of Big Data analytics is the amount of resources the 
state will dedicate to enforcing the law. While a bill has been introduced 
to expand consumers’ ability to sue businesses under the statute, at present 
enforcement authority for the act is dependent on actions brought by state 
officials. If the state does not invest considerable resources into punishing 
non-compliant companies, then it will become increasingly likely that the 
CCPA will not change private actors’ behaviors. 
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C. The Vermont Data Broker Law 
In May of 2018, the Vermont legislature became the first in the nation 
to pass a consumer protection law that specifically targets data brokers.133 
The stated goals of the legislation are: to provide consumers with 
necessary information about the operations of these companies and their 
right to opt-out; to ensure that consumers’ data is protected by adequate 
security; and to create a cause of action that consumers can use to protect 
themselves from wrongful uses of their data.134 The act also requires all 
data brokers that do business in Vermont to register with the Secretary of 
State, pay fees, and make annual disclosures about their operations.135 It 
also imposes data security requirements on brokers.136 The act does not, 
however, require data brokers to allow consumers to opt-out of having 
their data collected or sold.137 
Under the act, a company counts as a data broker if it “knowingly 
collects and sells or licenses to third parties the . . . personal information 
of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct 
relationship.”138 Examples of what constitutes a direct relationship include 
a consumer being a past or present customer, client, subscriber, employee, 
or investor of the business.139 
The act’s definition of what constitutes personal information is 
substantially less robust than the CCPA—it lists pieces of information that 
directly bear on an individual’s identity (e.g., name, address, Social 
Security number) and does not explicitly include information like an 
individual’s web-browsing history or personal preferences.140 While the 
definition does include a provision that could be viewed as a catch-all—
”other information that, alone or in combination with the other information 
sold or licensed, would allow a reasonable person to identify the consumer 
with reasonable certainty”—it seems as though personal information 
under the Vermont law will have a relatively narrow scope.141 Guidance 
issued by the state’s Attorney General, however, indicates that the catch-
all provision was intended to include any set of information that could 
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reasonably be used to identify a person constitutes personal information.142 
Publicly available information that is related to a consumer’s business or 
profession is specifically excluded from being considered personal 
information.143 
The Vermont law expressly prohibits the acquisition of consumers’ 
personal information through fraudulent means as well as acquiring 
personal data for certain uses, including “engaging in unlawful 
discrimination.”144 The act authorizes individuals to sue entities that do not 
comply with its requirements through the cause of action created by the 
state’s unfair and deceptive trade practices act.145 Vermont’s trade 
practices act authorizes courts to award compensatory damages, 
restitution, and attorney’s fees to successful plaintiffs.146 The state’s 
Attorney General is also authorized to bring actions to enforce the act’s 
provisions and can be awarded civil penalties of up to $10,000 per 
violation.147 
Because insurance companies typically do not sell consumers’ data 
to other parties it is unlikely that they will be considered data brokers under 
the Vermont statute. While this means that insurers will be exempt from 
the majority of the law’s provisions, they could still be held liable for 
violations of its rules concerning prohibited uses of personal 
information.148 The act does not explain what types of conduct constitute 
unlawful discrimination and the guidance document issued by the 
Attorney General only indicates that the term should be understood as it 
defined in other statutes and the state’s common law.149 This could leave 
the door open to insurers being sued by consumers under claims that the 
insurer acquired their personal information and used it in ways that led the 
insurer to treat members of protected classes worse than others. 
IV. PART III - WHERE REGULATION FALLS SHORT & HOW NEW 
LAWS COULD PREVENT ANALYTICS ABUSE 
Parts I and II identified how insurers’ uses of Big Data analytics could 
harm individuals and discussed the laws regulating how commercial 
entities use consumer data. With this information established, it is possible 
to assess where existing regulations fail to sufficiently protect consumers’ 
interests and proscribe additional actions. This Part begins by discussing 
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how current laws could deter some insurers from compiling consumer data 
altogether, then takes a closer look at regulatory gaps in three areas of 
insurers’ operations that will be most affected by analytics—marketing, 
underwriting, and claims management. 
A. General Compliance Costs 
One way that existing laws may succeed in limiting the use of Big 
Data analytics in consumer insurance is by imposing substantial 
compliance costs on companies that collect consumer data. While the 
FCRA, CCPA, and other data regulation laws do not directly charge 
companies substantial amounts to use consumer data, complying with the 
requirements set forth in these statutes may create large indirect costs for 
insurers. If compliance is expensive enough, it may become more efficient 
for insurance companies to forego consumer data analytics altogether. 
Will existing laws impose substantial enough costs to deter insurers? 
Laws that focus exclusively on regulating data brokers like the Vermont 
Data Broker Act will not, as it is atypical for insurers to sell consumer data 
and, thus, they will not qualify as brokers. The primary compliance costs 
created by the Fair Credit Reporting Act are imposed on entities that 
constitute consumer reporting agencies, not insurers. Insurers must, 
however, maintain internal systems to make sure that they issue FCRA-
required adverse action notices when they make certain types of 
underwriting decisions based on information purchased from consumer 
reporting agencies.150 Insurers already have measures in place to satisfy 
these requirements, FCRA-related compliance costs should be minimal. 
The California Consumer Privacy Act is the law that will create the 
largest compliance costs for insurers that use consumer data. Insurers that 
do business in California are highly likely to qualify as “businesses” within 
the regulation’s scope.151 The CCPA will force insurers to take actions that 
will enable them to comply with the law’s notification, disclosure, and data 
security requirements. While the costs associated with instituting these 
measures is not publicly known, they are likely to be substantial. 
Because of the potentially massive financial benefits that could come 
from the use of consumer-focused analytics, it seems unlikely that general 
compliance costs will be enough to deter insurers. The industry has such 
an established interest in pursuing analytics that additional reforms that 
merely add to these costs—for example, adopting a federal version of the 
CCPA or requiring all businesses to provide consumers with a right to 
deletion—would not dissuade them. Rather than attempt to use general 
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compliance requirements to dissuade insurers from using consumer data, 
the better approach will be to adopt rules that target the specific acts 
deemed to be abusive. 
B. Marketing 
There is very little in existing statutes that will have an impact on 
how insurers incorporate analytics into their marketing operations. As 
highlighted previously, this is significant because insurers will be able to 
use analytics-informed marketing practices to manipulate who becomes 
aware of their products and enters their applicant pool.152 Not only will 
this increase the risk that it will be harder for disadvantaged communities 
to access insurance, but it could also enable them to indirectly reduce the 
number of members of certain protected classes from their policyholder 
pool.153 
While the FCRA does impose some requirements on insurers that 
seek to use consumers’ data for marketing purposes, these provisions will 
not prevent these potential harms. The biggest problem with the FCRA’s 
rules in this context is that they will only limit an insurer’s actions if they 
are using information from a credit reporting agency. Because data brokers 
have not been considered to be credit reporting agencies unless they 
provide credit scores, insurers can avoid all of the FCRA’s marketing 
restrictions by either purchasing data from non-CRA brokers or gathering 
consumer data themselves. 
Similarly, the CCPA is unlikely to significantly affect insurers 
employing analytics-informed marketing practices. The California law’s 
primary mechanisms for giving consumers control over their data are 
simply a poor fit for these issues. Because insurers are likely to purchase 
consumer data from third-parties, they will not be required to issue 
disclosures directly to individuals and, hence, most individuals will not 
know whether an insurer is using their data to determine whether or not to 
market products to them. This lack of knowledge will also prevent 
consumers from effectively exercising their right to deletion. Realistically, 
the only CCPA-related mechanism that could prevent analytics-driven 
marketing practices is if consumers refuse to allow data brokers to sell 
their information, cutting insurers off from their primary source of data. 
Given that the Vermont Data Broker Act does not target insurers, it 
is perhaps surprising that it may be the law that poses the most substantial 
threat to the use of consumer data in marketing. While the law primarily 
regulates the conduct of data brokers, it contains a broad prohibition on 
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any commercial entity procuring consumer data if it is going to use that 
information in a way that is unlawfully discriminatory.154 As noted earlier, 
however, it is not clear which types (if any) of selective advertising 
practices may violate existing anti-discrimination laws. 
There are no easy regulatory solutions for the problems associated 
with selective marketing. One approach would be to bar insurers from 
using analytics-informed means for targeting their advertisements 
altogether. This, however, would cause substantial problems for insurance 
companies in the world of digital advertising, where data-driven 
algorithms select practically all of the advertisements that consumers 
view. A better approach would be for insurance regulators to take steps to 
ensure that, regardless of the particular advertising practices an insurer 
employs, the company has a diverse applicant pool. Focusing regulatory 
requirements on the composition of insurers’ applicant pools would permit 
companies the freedom to experiment with new advertising practices, 
while also providing the state a mechanism to ensure that vulnerable 
populations are not being ignored. 
C. Underwriting 
It is clear that each of the regulations discussed earlier will have some 
effect on insurers’ underwriting practices. What is unclear is whether the 
impediments created by these statutes will be sufficient to prevent insurers 
from delegating underwriting processes to AI-controlled algorithms. 
Ideally, the rules placed on insurers’ operations would allow computer-
driven decision-making that improves the actuarial fairness of the 
company’s actions, so long as those procedures do not impinge on 
autonomy, fairness, and other societal norms. 
The FCRA explicitly authorizes insurers to purchase consumer data 
from credit reporting agencies and use this data when making underwriting 
decisions. The rights that the act provides to consumers—the right to 
notification of adverse action, the right to review and correct credit 
reporting agency’s incorrect records—do not impose any direct limits on 
how insurers use their data. So long as an insurer’s underwriting 
procedures allow the company to determine when it needs to issue an 
adverse action notice to consumers, the FCRA does not regulate the 
process the company uses to determine an individual’s eligibility for 
insurance. Additionally, the FCRA places no limitations on insurers’ 
procurement and use of data if the information comes from a non-credit 
reporting agency source, such as non-CRA data brokers or insurers’ own 
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data collection efforts. Because of this, insurers will essentially always 
have the ability to opt-out of the FCRA’s rules. 
Whether the CCPA affects insurers’ use of analytics in underwriting 
will largely depend on how some of its most ambiguous provisions are 
construed. On its face, the act’s right to deletion provides a powerful 
mechanism for preventing the problems identified earlier. If consumers 
were able to force insurers to delete any information about the consumer 
that the insurer purchased from a broker, then insurers would be limited to 
looking at data the insurer collected directly from the consumer when 
making underwriting decisions. This would mean that insurers’ practices 
would look more like those used before the Big Data era. The CCPA, 
however, states that businesses do not have to comply with an individual’s 
request for deletion in a number of situations. Insurers faced with such 
requests will likely claim that they can keep consumers’ data because they 
are using it in ways “that are reasonably aligned with the expectations of 
the consumer based on the consumer’s relationship with the business.”155 
The resolution of disputes about the applicability of this exception will be 
a major determining factor of whether the CCPA plays a large role in 
insurers’ underwriting operations. The extent to which consumers’ 
exercise their rights to prevent data brokers from selling their data to 
insurers will also be important. 
Finally, it is possible that the Vermont Data Broker Act’s broad 
prohibition on the collection of consumer data for unlawfully 
discriminatory uses could affect insurers’ underwriting practices. Until 
this provision’s scope has been clarified, it is uncertain what standard will 
be used to determine whether insurance companies’ underwriting practices 
constitute unlawful discrimination. 
Given that none of the existing data use laws are likely to serve as 
substantial barriers to abusive algorithm-driven underwriting, additional 
regulation of insurers is necessary. The primary harms associated with 
insurers adopting a Big Data approach were that policyholders could be 
harmed if: decisions are made on the basis of correlations that seem 
tangential to the insured risks; preferential treatment is awarded based on 
immutable or luck-based characteristics; and insurers overreach when 
creating behavioral requirements for policyholders. All of these problems 
could be directly addressed through widespread adoption of regulatory 
measures that already exist in the insurance sphere. 
The most direct way to resolve concerns that insurance companies’ 
underwriting decisions will be based on specious correlations or criteria 
that unfairly disadvantage members of certain groups is to assert control 
over the factors that insurers are permitted to consider. Regulators have 
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developed two different approaches for doing this. First, there is the 
community rating approach, where a regulatory body determines a list of 
characteristics that insurers are allowed to consider when underwriting. 
Second, there is the file for approval approach, where insurers have to 
report the factors that it wants to base its underwriting decisions on to a 
regulatory body and receive its approval before doing so. Either of these 
approaches could effectively address both concerns by providing a 
safeguard against unfair decision-making processes. 
Similarly, the best way to deal with concerns about insurers using 
insurability criteria to control consumers’ behaviors is to require that 
insurers receive the approval of a regulator before adding coverage 
conditions to their policies. Many states already require insurers to submit 
their policy forms to a state body for approval.156 Existing procedures 
could be modified to ensure that insurers disclose not only any coverage 
limitations added to their forms, but any other requirements that applicants 
must satisfy to be offered a policy. 
D. Claims Management 
Similar to how regulations do not currently constrain insurers’ 
marketing practices, existing data use laws do not impose meaningful 
restraints on insurers’ claims management practices. Aside from laws that 
prohibit unfair commercial conduct generally and proscribe bad faith 
actions by insurers, the state has not taken actions to prevent insurers from 
using unfair procedures for handling policyholders’ claims. New rules 
need to be implemented to make sure that companies are not strategically 
denying or undervaluing the claims of vulnerable individuals. 
The only limit that the FCRA places on insurers’ use of consumer 
data in claims management is its general prohibition against using data 
from credit reporting agencies for non-approved purposes. The law does 
not restrict insurers’ ability to use data procured from non-credit reporting 
agencies for any purposes. 
The impact that the CCPA & Vermont Data Broker Act have on 
claims management practices will depend on the same factors identified 
in the prior section. If the exceptions to consumers’ right to deletion are 
construed expansively, then the CCPA will not limit insurers ability to use 
individuals’ when determining how to respond to their claims. Similarly, 
if individuals do not exercise their right to prevent brokers from selling 
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their personal data, then the CCPA will not impair insurers’ access to 
consumer data. The Vermont Data Broker Act’s potential to limit insurers’ 
ability to use consumer data in their operations depends on how its 
antidiscrimination provision is interpreted and enforced. 
A straightforward bar on insurers using consumers’ personal 
information when processing a claim seems like the ideal way to prevent 
the abuse of data analytics in the area of claims management. Once an 
insurer receives a claim under one of its policies, it is often clear what type 
of information will be relevant in determining whether the claim is covered 
or not. A rule that prohibits insurers from looking at any personal 
information the insurer possesses about the policyholder would effectively 
prevent insurers from profiling its policyholders and strategically denying 
claims. Given that some consumer information could be relevant to a 
coverage determination—e.g., the individual’s GPS-derived location at 
the time of loss, the individual’s purchase of accelerants the night of a 
fire—such a rule would need to include exceptions for data that insurers 
establish is directly linked to a claim. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that current statutes and regulations are not sufficient to 
prevent commercial entities from taking advantage of consumers. While it 
once appeared as though the Federal Trade Commission might serve as a 
force pushing for the regulation of consumer data,157 there has been little 
indication in recent years that the federal government will take major 
action in this area.  State legislatures in some states have begun to take up 
the mantle of data protection, but their efforts so far appear to be 
insufficient to address the concerns raised about the use of consumer data 
in insurance markets. In order to prevent insurers from engaging in unfair 
practices, state legislatures or regulatory bodies will need to enact rules 
that prohibit the specific behaviors identified in this Article. 
 
 
 157. See generally FTC, DATA BROKERS, supra note 34. 
